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The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
Development of Narco-Submarines
Abstract
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have been one of the world's most
consistently formidable violent non-state actors over the last forty years. Unsurprisingly,
the group has provided one of the most compelling and concerning examples of the level of
technical sophistication attainable by sub-state organizations. Over the last two decades
the group has carried out an iterative and innovative process that, in reaction to improved
detection capabilities, has brought them from depending on disposable go-fast boats to
transport drugs to possessing fully submersible and reusable covert vessels for
transportation. The following case study will discuss the development of narco-submarines
and the underlying motivations behind the pursuit of this complex engineering task. The
case study will outline the different phases of the narco-submarine development and
highlight FARC’s determination to overcome the challenges present in each design. This
discussion will show how FARC’s systematized acquiring of information and expertise has
resulted in the accomplishment of fully submersible vessels, capable of transporting more
than 10 tons of illicit product.
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Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
has found alternate methods to land-based border crossings for the
transportation of illicit drugs. These methods evolved from small aircraft
landings on clandestine airstrips to the use of go-fast boats for delivery along
the coasts of Mexico and the U.S. As detection efforts were bolstered in both
the countries of origin and destination, FARC led a pioneering effort to
develop a furtive method of transportation that could convey a large amount
of cocaine to the U.S. By 1990, FARC had designed and constructed the first
known “narco-submarine” used for the transportation of drugs.
FARC provides one of the most compelling examples on how violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) use transformational technologies to adapt and
overcome challenging dynamics. The innovative capacity of FARC is
derivative of its blend in ideology, desire for self-sufficiency, financial
potential and commitment to organizational learning and strength. 1 The
iterative process in the development of narco-subs by FARC is illustrative of
the long-term commitment VNSAs with resources can devote to innovative
projects that facilitate their strategic objectives. The broader implication
being that clandestine organizations are willing to undertake complex
engineering tasks in their efforts to overcome defensive technologies
implemented by state actors. Brian Jackson, et al., states that groups like
these are “acutely aware of government efforts to deploy such
countermeasures and actively see ways to evade or counteract them.”2
While the development of weapons and the cultivation of other martial
technologies by state actors have been comprehensively addressed by
military and technological historians,3 processes of innovation and the
engagement in complex engineering efforts such as the narco-submarine on
the part of violent non-state actors remain understudied phenomena. The
origin and diffusion of innovations in weapon development, according to

Román D. Ortiz, “Renew to Last: Innovation and Strategy of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC)” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the
Terrorist World (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp. 205-222.
2 Jackson, Brian et.al, Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to
Overcome Defensive Technologies, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007).
3 For information on military history and the advent of military technology adoption
please refer to: Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of
Hisotry, 1500 to Today, (New York, NY: Gothman Books, 2006); Martin Van Creveld,
Technology and War: From 2000BC to the Present, (New York, NY: The Free Press,
1991).
1
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Ackerman, has only really blossomed in the past four decades.4 As a result,
most of the debate in this topic has been limited to conventional warfare
(within a post-World War II paradigm) and determining to what extent
technological developments may influence both the onset and outcome of
war between state actors. 5 As the introduction to this special issue states,
there remain large gaps in the understanding of the dynamics of VNSA
innovation in terms of complex engineering tasks, as well as some question
as to what observable instances of new technology adoption can further
enrich the understanding of the pursuit of complex engineering efforts by
groups like FARC. This historical case study outlines the evolution of an
initial attempt to construct a narco-submarine. The adoption of this novel
technology by FARC analyzes two key aspects important for countersmuggling and terrorism efforts: 1) provides relevant data on FARC’s ability
to engage in a complex effort and 2) takes into account the organizational
limitations and constraints that may influence the technical capabilities and
activities of this clandestine organization. The following sections detail the
undertaking of this complex engineering effort by FARC in an era where
technological innovation is no longer a one-sided game.
Narco-submarines,6 also referred to as ‘narco-subs’, are custom-made, selfpropelled maritime vessels intended to smuggle illicit goods to the United
States from South and/or Central America.7 The earlier designs of narcosubmarines consisted of semi-submersible vessels. These vessels are capable
of controlling their running depth but cannot fully submerge. More recent
designs include vessels that are submersible. They are equipped with
sophisticated radar and navigational technology and are capable of full
submersion to be virtually undetectable. These vessels also possess selfpropulsion capabilities allowing them to travel longer distances. 8
According to a written statement to the Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security House Committee in 2012, maritime drug smuggling
4 Gary

A. Ackerman, “More Bang for the Buck: Examining the Determinants of Terrorist
Adoption of New Weapons Technologies” (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, King’s
College London 2013).
5 Ibid.
6 The term narco-submarines is commonly used to describe all types of vessels (low
profile vessels, self-propelled semi-submersibles and fully submersibles). Even though
the early iterations of the vessels discussed in this study did not have full submersion
capabilities, this study uses narco-subs to maintain consistency with the sources used.
7 Robert J. Bunker and Byron Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels
Used for Drug Smuggling Purposes,” Foreign Military Studies Office, May 2014: 9,
available at: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/Interagency/NarcoSubmarines.pdf.
8 Ibid.

50
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1509

Jacome Jaramillo: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

accounted for over 80 percent of the total illicit drug flow from the Andean
region to Honduras, Mexico and other mid-way transportation regions prior
to entry into the United States.9 The Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) estimates that approximately 30 percent of the maritime flow utilizes
narco-submarines.10 Since narco-subs have become increasingly difficult to
detect and seize due to the sophisticated innovations in radar shielding
techniques and navigation equipment, the United States continues to have
little interdiction success. 11 Approximately 74 percent of suspected maritime
drug trafficking goes unpursued.12
The success of narco-submarines can be attributed to the iterative evolution
in design and development of the vessels. The engineering and technology
employed in the construction of these vessels have improved since the first
interdiction of a semi-submersible in 1993 near the San Andres Islands in
Colombia. By 2011, law enforcement had destroyed construction sites along
the Colombian Pacific coastline and had seized numerous models and
versions of these vessels, among them Low Profile Vessels (LPV), SelfPropelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS), Submersible/Fully Submersible
Vessels (FSV) and narco containers/torpedoes.13

Decision
Craigin, et al., addresses the adoption and diffusion of technology through
organizational theory and terrorism. Even though diffusion of technology is
beyond the scope of this case study, the initial analytical framework of this
theory is relevant as a counter-veiling example on how terrorist groups make
the decision to absorb new technology. The underlying assumption of
technology diffusion is that “potential users of a new technology will absorb it
when and if they learn of its existence, as long as barriers to the uptake do not
exist.”14 Furthermore the theory states the technology will be acquired by the
Rear Admiral Charles Michel, Director Joint Interagency Task Force South, “Hearing on
Border Security Threats to the Homeland: DHS’s Response to Innovative Tactics and
Technique,” Written statement before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security House Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, June
19, 2012, 3, available at: https://homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Michel.pdf.
10 “Inside Cocaine Wars: Narco Sub Mystery,” National Geographic Channel, 2013,
available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aO3hikt5H3k.
11 Byron Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note #1,” Small Wars Journal (February
2014): 1-5.
12 Rear Admiral Charles Michel, “Hearing on Border Security Threats to the Homeland:
DHS’s Response to Innovative Tactics and Technique.”
13 Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note #1.”
14 Kim Cragin et.al, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of
New Technologies, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007).
9
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sharing of information between current and new potential users.15 In the case
of FARC, this is only partially applicable. FARC had two primary motivations
behind the decision to undertake this complex engineering effort: 1) to
counteract improved detection / interdiction efforts and 2) financial gain.
These drivers have similarly led to the adoption of new techniques by other
criminal organizations in Colombia. With the adoption of new radar and
communications technologies in the 1990s, law enforcement’s detection
capabilities improved significantly.16 Therefore, the decision to engage in the
development of narc-submarine vessels was not in fact triggered by the
availability of this already existing military technology; it was triggered by the
new challenge it faced with new improved counter-smuggling efforts.
Technology adoption by FARC was an active decision intended to solve the
group’s current problem. Technology adoption theory indicates that
organizations make the active decision to pursue new technology “under
conditions of uncertainty.”17 Since traditional transportation no longer
proved effective in the face of these newly acquired law enforcement detection
capabilities, the use of “innovative logistical tool[s]” was necessary to reduce
the risk of interdiction and capture.18 Even though the adoption of narcosubmarines was a potential solution to the risk of interdiction, it also
translated into latent risks of misjudgments about the technology and the
overall failure of adoption that included all the added costs of the new
technology and none of the benefits reaped. 19 In spite of these conditions, the
final decision to undertake the development of narco-subs for FARC was
motivated by the tactical advantages over other forms of transportation.20
FARC’s decision-making structure is a combination of centralized political
leadership and decentralized operational units. The centralized leadership
consists of the general secretariat which provides political direction.21 The
operational units, however, are decentralized, which allows each unit to
15 Ibid.

Bunker and Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for Drug
Smuggling Purposes.”
17 Cragin et.al, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth.
18 Byron Ramirez, “Narco-Submarines: Applying Advanced Technologies to Drug
Smuggling,” Small Wars Journal (March 8, 2014): 1-6.
19 Cragin et.al, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth.
20 It is important to note that the motivation was not a tactical move related to their
political ideology. Donald B. Davis, “The Submersible Threat to Maritime Homeland
Security,” (Master Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, September 2013), available at:
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/37609/13Sep_Davis_Donald.pdf?seq
uence=1.
21 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Origins and Development of the Guerillas in Colombian
Labyrinth (Arlington: Rand, 2001).
16
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operate with autonomy and focus on specialized activities. Specifically, the
organization is divided into six different commands, each composed of at
least five fronts that represent different geographic territories.22 The Joint
Western Command, the most profit-driven and least politically inclined bloc
of FARC, claims responsibility for most of the group’s semi-submersible
operations in the Pacific region.23 Economic activities led by the Joint
Western Command results in approximately 65 percent of the group’s total
revenue.24
The level of participation by each front in the decision-making process to
adopt the development of narco-subs is unknown. However, given the
organizational structure discussed above, the decision to first engage in this
activity most likely involved the central leadership of FARC. Both the general
secretariat, the ultimate deciding body of the organization, and the Joint
Western Command, were thus most likely actively involved and provided
approval in the initial pursuit of this new venture.
It had become evident by the late 1990s that other sea and air-based methods
lacked the ability to carry large quantities of drugs in a single shipment and
there had been a series of interdictions of vessels belonging to FARC.25
Moreover, ground transportation resulted in lengthy, high-risk trips while gofast boats had a 50 percent interdiction rate.26 Furthermore, FARC’s
traditional methods for counteracting modern detection capabilities and
facilitate narcotics operations, which included bribery and/or coercion of
officials, concealment of merchandise in cargo containers, and use of
underground tunnels, became less attractive as the possibility of carrying larger
quantities in narco-submarines became available.
Ibid.
The Joint Western Command controls numerous fronts in the southern and
midwestern areas of Colombia.
24 Armando Hernandez, Rick A. Galeano, and Mario Escobar, “The Semi-submersible
Network,” (Master Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012), available at:
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/27844/12Dec_Hernandez_Galeano_
Escobar.pdf?sequence=1.
25 “Colombia halla ‘narcosubmarino’ supuestamente de FARC en frontera con Ecuador,”
El Universo, Octuber 2014, available at:
http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2014/10/22/nota/4135331/colombia-hallanarcosubmarino-supuestamente-farc-frontera-ecuador.
26 Ivan P. Arias Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y
Reflotamiento del Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el Ecuador,” (Master Thesis:
ESPOL, 2013), available at:
https://www.dspace.espol.edu.ec/bitstream/123456789/25046/1/INFORME%20NARC
OSUBMARINO%20IVAN%20ARIAS.pdf; Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note #1;
“Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com, February 15, 2011, available at
http://www.vice.com/video/colombian-narcosubs.
22
23
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As a result, Narco-subs became an increasingly frequent method of covert
transportation for FARC by the early 2000s.27 Even though authorities have
not been able to attribute the construction of these submersibles to a specific
front or obtain information regarding the decision-making process, it can be
presumed that each operational unit (if more than one is involved) has the
capability and discretion to decide when to engage in the development of
narco-subs in its territory. The fronts in the southern pacific border of
Colombia28 are more likely to make this decision, given that the difficult
terrain and mangroves of the region provide the traffickers with the ideal
conditions to establish rudimentary construction sites that are difficult for law
enforcement to reach and have access to the sea. Regardless of the autonomy
provided by the decentralized structure, however, the high estimated costs for
construction of the vessels as well as the large quantity of shipments intended
to be carried, likely required at least some coordination between central
leadership and operational units, in order to disburse the resources and
schedule transportation of the illicit product to open-sea loading areas.29
According to the testimonies of incarcerated narco-sub crew members,
decision making at sea is made remotely by the leader of the front, who in
turn receives guidance from the Joint Western Command. For example, if a
vessel were to suffer interdiction, the captain of the submersible is
responsible for immediately notifying the leader of his front via satellite
communication, who then must give the order to sink and/or abandon the
vessel.30 This system is partially attributed to the overall checks and balances
instituted by FARC’s central leadership to keep tabs on drug profits as well as
each front’s operating procedures.

Even though risk about the decision-making process of adopting a new
technology is addressed above, the risk assumed during the process of
innovation can also provide an important perspective of the criminal
Ramirez, “Narco-Submarines: Applying Advanced Technologies to Drug Smuggling.”
Erich C. Saumeth, “Narco-Semi-Sumergibles y Sumergibles,” Universidad de Federal
de Juiz de Fora, 2011, available at: http://www.ecsbdefesa.com.br/defesa/fts/NSS.pdf.
29 Loading of the illicit product was usually carried out in the open sea. The added weight
of the shipment would not allow the vessel to navigate outside the construction estuaries
if the drugs were loaded at this location. “Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com.
30 Acccording to Colombian law, if there is no evidence of illicit activities (no product is
found), the interdiction becomes a rescue mission and the drug traffickers cannot be
prosecuted. Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y Reflotamiento
del Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el Ecuador;” “Narcosubmarinos,” Discovery
Channel, 2010, available at: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xw6h6n_discoverychannel-narcosubmarinos_tech.
27

28
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organization’s behavior. Open source literature does not make direct
reference to the risk tolerance of FARC during the development of the narcosubs, however the group is widely known to engage in dangerous operations
while operating in a high-risk environment. Previous activities have
demonstrated that the organization does not shy away from innovation. For
example, the group reached out to the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA) to receive training in the use of explosives,31 it has dabbled in the
potential trafficking of RN materials,32 and has engaged in violent behavior,
including the kidnapping high-level officials and keeping prisoners for
leverage in negotiations.33 Despite FARC’s penchant for high-risk
confrontation, in the case of the narco-subs, the group appears to have
attempted to minimize risk and has successfully mitigated interdiction by
selecting clandestine locations for construction; the sites are on shallow-river
systems, difficult for law enforcement to transverse, and with vast mangroves
providing necessary camouflage.34
FARC’s development of narco-subs has constituted a long-term endeavor in
terms of planning and execution. After the initial decision to pursue the
development of narco-subs, FARC continued to innovate and improve on the
initial designs. This became evident to law enforcement during seizures. The
evolution of the vessels proceeded from rudimentary designs to sophisticated
aerodynamic vessels equipped with telecommunication systems.35 According
to a former drug-trafficker, “Looking back, it appears to be that the
Colombian cartel was honing their skills in preparation for their ultimate
goal—the construction of a long-distance vessel that could dive and surface on
command.”36 The implication is that the evolution of the vessels and the
immediate benefits from successful smuggling trips using the early designs
serviced the long-term technical and developmental goals of the group. It is

Andy Oppenheimer, “How terrorists acquire technology and training: lessons from the
IRA,” New Security Learning, 2009, available at:
http://www.newsecuritylearning.com/index.php/feature/123-how-terrorists-acquiretechnology-and-training-lessons-from-the-ira.
32 “El Uranio de las FARC,” El Espectador, 2008, available at:
http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/cuadernilloa/judicial/articuloimpreso-eluranio-de-farc
33 “Las FARC liberan rehenes y piden cambiar reglas del proceso de paz,” El Observador,
2014, available at: http://www.elobservador.com.uy/las-farc-liberan-rehenes-y-pidencambiar-reglas-del-proceso-paz-n293141
34 Armando Hernandez, Rick A. Galeano, and Mario Escobar, “The Semi-submersible
Network.”
35 “Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com.
36 Jim Popkin, “Authorities in Awe of Drug Runners’ Jungle-Built Kevlar-Coated
Supersubs,” Wired.com, 2011, available at:
http://www.wired.com/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/1.
31
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evident from this timeline and evolution in design that FARC did in fact invest
in a long-term development program to optimize its narco-subs’ designs.
The initial investment in this new technology was expected be extremely
high.37 FARC invested significant financial and human resources to develop
and improve designs. According to a report released by the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Colombian National Police, some narcosub crew members have been graduate engineers of SENA (the National
Learning Service) in Colombia.38 It remains unclear, however, whether these
experts were sent expressly to acquire the necessary skills for this engineering
feat or received this training before engaging with the organization. “This
ability to invest and take on long-term, high-value projects is a warning of the
traffickers’ high level of resources and organization.”39 This commitment also
signals an overarching aptitude for organizational learning, which is evident
in the practices surrounding the decision-making process and later on in the
implementation phases of the adoption of this new technology. FARC’s
openness and willingness to learn from study and experience alike allowed
the group to spread tactical and operational knowledge to its members and
also enabled them to identify their most apt followers for the development of
this technology.40 The evident change in behavior and modification of
operational practices that resulted as a response to this new knowledge and
experience could have facilitated the decision and adoption of this new longterm strategic objective and investment.41
Indeed, the amount invested in the construction and development was
negligible in comparison to the profits expected from the drug sales per
shipment.42 It is estimated that the cost of construction of a vessel capable of
transporting eight tons of narcotics is less than 2 million dollars with a net
return of over $200 million. 43 There have also been reports that FARC sold or
Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note #1.”
Ana Maria Saavedra, “La tecnologia de los submarinos al servicio del narcotráfico,” El
Pais, 2011, available at: http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/nautilusservicio-mafia.
39 Hannah Stone, “Rawfeed: The Evolution of the Drug Submarine,” InSight Crime, 2011,
available at: http://insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-evolution-of-the-drugsubmarine.
40 Michael Kenney. “How Terrorists Learn” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical
Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp.
33-51.
41 Kenney, Michael, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks,
Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation (University Park, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).
42 Ramirez, “Narco-Submarines: Applying Advanced Technologies to Drug Smuggling.”
43 Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note #1.”
37

38
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rented narco-subs and their designs to other collaborating organizations
which not only diversified FARC’s source of income but also increased its
margin of profit.44 This latter point illustrates the broader implication of the
development of this new technology and how it may facilitate smuggling
efforts for criminal organizations, not only for other violent non-state actors
in Colombia, but potentially in Mexico as well.

Implementation
Reports indicate that the Joint Western Command of FARC is responsible for
most of the organization’s semi-submersible operations.45 Even though the
precise role played by the operational units remains unclear to authorities,
individuals who have been arrested have revealed that narco-sub operations
are carefully carried out by a tactical team, assumed to be in close
coordination with the leadership. Construction camps established in the
southern Pacific coastline consist of approximately 30 low-level members
responsible for securing the campsite and carrying material, as well as the
technicians responsible for building the vessel.46 Additionally, the
organization is also known to have used and hosted Russian, Sri Lankan, and
Pakistani naval engineers to assist in the design and construction of narcosubmarines, not only demonstrating their commitment to the adoption of this
new technology but also taking advantage of technological diffusion47 across
actors.48 Additional reports from the Colombian National Police state that the
group may have occasionally subcontracted out construction of the
submersibles to a professional service unaware of what the ultimate purpose
of the vessels was.49 Authorities have also discovered that the construction
process is carried out across several phases, involving different locations and
different subcontractors. 50
Not all those involved in construction and deployment of the vessels do so on
a voluntary basis, however. In 2008, Colombian authorities interdicted a
vessel with four crew members.51 These individuals, who had been previously
Kirk Semple, “The Submarine Next Door,” New York Times, 2000, available at:
http://partners.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20001203mag-semple.html.
45 Hernandez, Galeano, and Escobar, “The Semi-submersible Network.”
46 “Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com.
47 Cragin et.al, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth.
48 Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y Reflotamiento del
Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el Ecuador;” Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel
Tactical Note #1;” Armando Hernandez, Rick A. Galeano, and Mario Escobar, “The Semisubmersible Network.”
49 Semple, “The Submarine Next Door.”
50 Saumeth, “Narco-Semi-Sumergibles y Sumergibles.”
51 Ana Maria Saavedra, “La tecnologia de los submarinos al servicio del narcotráfico.”
44
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identified as trained naval engineers, 52 informed authorities that they had
been kidnapped and taken to one of these sites and were coerced into
collaborating in the construction of a vessel.53
The areas of expertise and knowledge required for the development of narcosubmarines include technical design and construction (i.e., engineers,
welders, electricians, fiberglass installers), experts in maritime equipment
(primarily for navigation), and experienced seafarers to serve as
crewmembers.54 With the rapid evolution in the sophistication of narco-subs,
the level of technical expertise required naturally increased.55 The need for
naval engineers and trained navigators has pushed FARC to seek out experts
from the Colombian navy, offering large sums of money in exchange for their
skills. According to Roman Ortiz, FARC’s ability to recruit university students
and send members to higher education institutions across the country to
study science and engineering, exponentially increases its potential for
technological sophistication.56 FARC’s notable capacity for learning is evident
through its training camps and programs that often provide members with
information on how to utilize new weapons and become familiar with guerilla
warfare tactics. 57 Additionally, the group has not shied away from using
violence and coercion, forcing individuals with the needed skillsets to assist
them in the development of the narco-subs, as described above and testified
to by arrested group members.58
The complexity of narco-sub technology has inherent limitations and risks
which FARC had to face during the implementation phase. The successful
adoption of this new technology was dependent on the characteristics of the
technology itself and the ability of FARC to absorb the knowledge required to
build and operate the vessels. According to Cragin, in order for the new
technology to be effective, the implementing organization must have the
“appropriate knowledge to use the technology successfully.” 59 As discussed
above, FARC diversified the acquisition of technology through explicit
Ibid.
Ibid.
54 Saumeth, “Narco-Semi-Sumergibles y Sumergibles.”
55 Bunker and Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for Drug
Smuggling Purposes.”
56 Román D. Ortiz, “Renew to Last: Innovation and Strategy of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC)” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the
Terrorist World (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp. 205-222.
57 Ibid.
58 Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y Reflotamiento del
Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el Ecuador;” Ramirez, Byron, “Colombian Cartel
Tactical Note #1”.
59 Cragin et.al, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth.
52
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knowledge (e.g. design drawings of vessels) and tacit-knowledge60 (e.g. “howto” skills), many times achieved through coercion, deceit, or bribery. FARC’s
ability to absorb explicit and tacit knowledge has been evident through past
operations and collaborations with other criminal organizations. For
example, in 1997 FARC sought out explosive expertise from the PIRA to
further promote its ideological causes through urban terrorism.61 The
stalemate between the Colombian government and the group placed an
enormous amount of pressure on the leadership, which had not been able to
move forward with the group’s demands. As a result, there was a change in
strategy that required more weapons and explosive technologies. FARC
requested the assistance of PIRA, who excelled in the use of sophisticated
mortars and other weapons. It was not long after that three mortar-bomb
experts from PIRA were brought to Colombia to train FARC members.62 The
strategic acquisition of knowledge from other groups for FARC is a viable and
relatively easy solution considering their network and resources.
When it comes to collaboration with external entities for the development of
the narco-subs, early reports do indicate that the Cartel Norte del Valle might
have been the organization that initially came up with the idea of narco-subs;
however, this group did not have the resources or skills to act on it.63 The
majority of sources indicate that FARC has primary control over the
development of narco-subs in Colombia. However, authorities believe that
with the numbers of narco-subs suspected of being in operation ballooning, it
is likely that FARC is not the only drug trafficking organization (DTO)
involved in this kind of enterprise.64 It is important to note that, even though
Colombian authorities have evidence of collaboration between Colombian and
Central American DTOs in smuggling operations, no direct connection has
been made with regard to any collaboration on narco-sub development.
Classes of knowledge adapted from Jeffrey L. Cummings, Knowledge Transfer Across
R&D Units: An Empirical Investigation of the Factors Affecting Successful Knowledge
Transfer Across Intra- and Inter-Organizational Units, unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Washington, D.C.: School of Business and Public Management, George
Washington University, (2002); Gunnar Hedlund, “A Model of Knowledge Management
and the N-Form Corporation,” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15 (Special Issue),
Strategy: Search for New Paradigms, 1994; Rogers, Everett M., Diffusion of Innovations
(New York, NY: The Free Press, 1995) and Bernard Simonin, “Ambiguity and the Process
of Knowledge Exchange in Strategic Alliances,” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 20,
No. 7, 1999.
61 Martin Hodgson, Henry McDonald, and Peter Beaumont, “IRA Blunder in the Jungle
Sparks US Rage,” The Observer, August 19, 2001, available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/aug/19/northernireland.ireland.
62 Jeremy McDermott, “Colombian Attacks ‘Have Hallmark of IRA,’” BBC News, August
11, 2002, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2186244.stm.
63 “Narcosubmarinos,” Discovery Channel.
64 Ibid.
60
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With regard to other sources of collaboration, authorities have reported the
use of professionalized services (individuals and/or groups) that are not
linked to drug trafficking networks. For example, there is one known civilian
contributor that has assisted in the crafting of narco-subs–Enrique
Portocarrero aka “Captain Nemo.”65 He has designed and built as many as
“20 fiberglass submarines, designed to resemble sea creatures, for drug
traffickers to haul cocaine from Southern Colombia to Central America and
Mexico.”66
FARC is known to have meticulously maintained operational security during
the development of narco-subs. To avoid detection, workers completed much
of the construction of these vehicles under the protection of thick jungle
canopy.67 The daily tidal fluctuations of the mangroves also limit and prohibit
access via boat.68 In addition, “local muscle” armed with automatic rifles and
grenades provided increased security.69 FARC members are also known to
have preventative measures in place to avoid prosecution in the case of an
interdiction at sea.70
In terms of safety of the crew members, the group has been less cautious.
FARC lacked concern for the well-being and safety of the personnel involved
in the construction and journey phases. The treacherous environment of the
mangroves entailed poor living conditions in construction sites. 71
Furthermore, the subs themselves are known to have had extremely cramped
living quarters.72 Crewmen traveled long distances with limited food and

Watkins, Lance J., Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles: The Next Great Threat To
Regional Security and Stability. Naval Postgraduate School, 2011, available at:
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/June/11Jun_Watkins.pdf .
66 Watkins, Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles: The Next Great Threat To Regional
Security and Stability.
67 Hernandez, Galeano, and Escobar, “The Semi-submersible Network.”
68 Ibid.
69 Jim Popkin, “The High Seas: How a high school-educated drug smuggler built a fleet of
submarines–in the middle of the jungle–to ferry cocaine to the United States,” Slate,
2013, available at:
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/10/mauner_mahe
cha_s_drug_submarines_inside_a_high_tech_south_american_narco.html.
70 The captain is instructed to sink the vessel and turn the interdiction into a rescue
mission. “Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com; Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de
Completamiento y Reflotamiento del Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el
Ecuador.”
71 Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y Reflotamiento del Primer
Narcosumerible Encontrado en el Ecuador;” Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note
#1;” Hernandez, Galeano, and Escobar, “The Semi-submersible Network.”
72 “Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com.
65
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without sleep or running water. While inside the narco-subs, they were
confined to a loud capsule often filled with engine fumes.73 Finally, in the
case of an impending interdiction, the front leader would often willingly sink
the vessel, leaving the crewmembers adrift at sea.74
Appendix A provides a detailed description and images of the historical
evolution of the narco-submarines. The following section describes the
general construction process from start to finish of the most complex vessel
developed: the submarine.
Experts have divided the evolution of the design of the submersible vessels
into three distinct phases:
1. 1992-2004: This phase consisted of experimentation through trial and
error. The vessels were constructed using fiberglass material and were
usually between 30 to 50 feet in length.
2. 2005-2006: This phase reflected rapid prototyping with increased
capability and the use of self-propelled technologies. Vessels
incorporated wood to the fiberglass previously used and varied in
range and capacity.
3. 2007 to the present: This current phase incorporates mature designs
and greater standardization.75 The vessels are faster and have a higher
carrying and storage capacity. Some designs include the use of steel
with specialized lead shielding to avoid detectors. Additionally, these
vessels incorporate the use of advanced navigation systems, GPS and
other anti-radar features. 76
Overall, the emphasis FARC placed on research and development resulted in
a series of improvements, ranging from semi-submersibles intended only to
last one trip to submarines with sophisticated navigation equipment and

“Narcosubmarinos,” Discovery Channel.
Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y Reflotamiento del
Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el Ecuador;” Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel
Tactical Note #1.”
75 Terrance G. Lichtenwald, Mara H. Steinhour, and Frank S. Perri, “A Maritime Threat
Assessment of Sea Based Criminal Organizations and Terrorist Operations,” Homeland
Security Affairs 8:13 (2013), available at: https://www.hsaj.org/articles/227.
76 Phases extracted from Bunker and Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated
Vessels Used for Drug Smuggling Purposes.”
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communication technologies capable of transporting over eight tons of
material and making numerous trips.77
According to numerous sources, the first step in the construction process is to
identify a location to carry out the construction of the vessel. The location is
selected based upon the feasibility of the site for bringing in construction
materials via the river systems, accessibility to the ocean, and ability to
operate covertly throughout the construction process. Thick mangrove
vegetation provides an excellent cover for construction sites and is difficult for
law enforcement to patrol due to its sheer density.78 Building submersible
sites close to the ocean is also a prerequisite because, upon completion, these
underwater vehicles must have a navigable route downstream to estuaries
where they can begin their voyage into the Pacific Ocean.79 Typically, these
vessels are built near the Pacific coastline of Colombia, in or near the regions
of Sanquianga and Buenaventura.80
Concurrent with the identification of the construction site, personnel are
selected according to their expertise. Following the fulfillment of these two
requisite goals, the initial infrastructure needed for the construction effort is
built. The materials needed for the sites are transported via river systems
along the pacific coastline of Colombia. These rivers are only accessible at
certain times of the day, depending on tidal cycles.81 According to the
testimony of detainees (predominantly naval engineers), the construction is
carried out in phases.82 The exact process of construction remains largely
unknown to authorities, however, many of the seized vessels have been
evaluated and experts claim that the methods used to construct the narcosubs are organized, compartmentalized and specialized.83 In one instance, a
vessel captured in the northern region of Ecuador was evaluated within the
framework of the expanded ship work break structure (ESWBS).84 Through
Bunker and Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for Drug
Smuggling Purposes,” 12.
78 Ibid.
79 Hernandez, Galeano, and Escobar, “The Semi-submersible Network.”
80 Ibid.
81 Popkin, “The High Seas: How a high school-educated drug smuggler built a fleet of
submarines–in the middle of the jungle–to ferry cocaine to the United States.”
82 Saumeth, “Narco-Semi-Sumergibles y Sumergibles.”
83 The ESWBS is a system of project management instituted by the Project Management
Institute and often used in training to compartmentalize the different systems needed in
the submersibles. Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y
Reflotamiento del Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el Ecuador.”
84 The ESWBS is a set of guidelines used by the United States Navy to identify the
different components of the structure and systems needed in the construction of
submersibles. It is also used as a project management practice by the Project
77

62
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1509

Jacome Jaramillo: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

this evaluation, it became evident that the vessel’s construction had followed
similar guidelines; shining light on the sophisticated nature of the systems,
not only in the vessel and its construction, but also the procedures and
planning that had been undertaken.85 Even though it is unclear whether this
formal framework is used at all construction sites, it has provided authorities
with a blueprint of the general process of construction of narco-subs.
General Construction Process86
Process
Description
General
 Construction of the main hull and all the structural
Hull
divisions (bulkheads), platforms, frame
Structure
reinforcements of the bow and stern, and bases for
equipment.
 Welding of all compartments and unions, ballast
tanks, masts, service platforms, trapdoors and
cabins.
Propulsion
 Installation of energy converters, propulsion gears,
Plant
twin engines, generators, cooling and fuel systems,
oil services, and water recycling systems.
General
 Backup generators and air conditioning systems
Electric
(when available). The overall electric source and
Plant
conduits that provide power to all the systems.
Command
 Installation of satellite, radar, sonar, GPS (and
and
overall communication) technologies.
Surveillance
Auxiliary
 Installation of systems that provide fresh water, and
System
lubrication. (This system is only occasionally
included as it is primarily to provide comfort to
crewmembers.)
Outfit and
 Paint jobs, stowage, working spaces, living quarters.
Furnishings
Armament
 None. The storage spaces traditionally designated for
armaments serve as additional room for narcotics

Management Institute and often used in training to compartmentalize the different
systems needed in the submersibles. Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de
Completamiento y Reflotamiento del Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el
Ecuador.”
85 Saumeth, “Narco-Semi-Sumergibles y Sumergibles.”
86 Processes of construction of a submersible interdicted in Ecuador in 2011 as described
by: Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y Reflotamiento del
Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el Ecuador.”
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Integration
and
Engineering



and other illicit goods being transported by the
vessel.
Training of crewmembers, inspections, trials,
schematics. Processes to ensure the viability of the
trip.

Recent vessel seizures illustrate further evolution in narco-sub design
capabilities. In contrast to the early semi-submersible vessels found in
Colombia, fully submersible vessels have been found since 2011 that are 30
meters long and three meters wide, and “can carry four crew members in an
air-conditioned interior, which even features a small galley. Perhaps most
importantly, it can carry eight tons of cocaine, dive eight meters underwater,
and make the long voyage to the coast of Mexico with only a periscope
remaining above the surface.”87
The implementation process was not without hurdles, however. The group
faced different obstacles throughout the evolution of the narco-subs. Initially,
they encountered flaws in design, essentially utilizing the basic go-fast boat
structure with a wraparound hull. Even though these vessels resulted in a
higher rate of successful trips (predominantly due to the vessel’s camouflage
at sea), these semi-submersibles were still detectable by air because they
could not fully submerge. Additionally, due to design constraints and
inexperience in this engineering feat, vessels could only be used once and
could not carry more than 2 to 4 tons.88 Regarding more sophisticated
designs, the group took over twenty years to perfect the fully submersible
model. FARC’s perseverance is evident, as it did not abandon efforts to build
a fully submersible vessel. The main obstacles to achieving the most recent
design had to do with acquiring the necessary expertise to incorporate the
most complex systems utilized by these vessels. These included systems
related to the full submersion capability and satellite communications
systems. Additionally, many of these systems had to be manufactured inhouse, which extended the construction time period.89

Analysis and Conclusion
While the main motivations behind the decision to develop narco-subs are
described above, it is important to point out why FARC made the decision to
Stone, “Rawfeed: The Evolution of the Drug Submarine.”
Bunker and Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for Drug
Smuggling Purposes.”
89 Ibid.
87

88
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construct these vessels in-house and to continue pursuing this technology
despite the difficulties. The reasons FARC undertook this complex
engineering effort therefore include:
1. Avoiding Detection–As an illicit enterprise, FARC seeks to remain
clandestine. As such, the adoption of narco-subs prolonged its ability
to operate under the radar. This is especially true now that FARC has
successfully constructed fully submersible vessels, which are almost
impossible to detect.90 The adoption of GPS and satellite technology by
Colombian law enforcement dramatically improved smuggling
detection efforts. To counteract this, the group invested in engineering
and technological measures to persist and keep the competitive
advantage in drug smuggling.91
2. Profit–The organization is profit-driven, which is one of the key
reasons why narco-subs in particular were selected. As previously
mentioned, the cost to construct these vessels was low relative to the
profit gained from successful smuggling journeys. Colombian
authorities estimate that with one successful trip with a vessel carrying
seven tons of cocaine, FARC would earn approximately $175 million
dollars.92
3. Long-term Development–Evidence suggests that, in spite of the
obstacles present in this complex engineering task, FARC persevered
in acquiring a true narco-sub capability because it foresaw the
advantages of eventually succeeding in having a fleet of fully functional
submarines. FARC was prepared to tolerate setbacks along the way in
order to achieve this ultimate goal. Moreover, as designs evolved, the
vessels increased in storage capacity, thus increasing the profit margin
of each trip.
The organization ultimately succeeded in its goal of acquiring fully
submersible vessels. This can be attributed primarily to:
1. Financial and human resources–The group invested vast resources
over the span of 20 years to perfect the submersible design. FARC’s

Davis, “The Submersible Threat to Maritime Homeland Security.”
Bunker and Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for Drug
Smuggling Purposes.”
92 “Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com
90
91
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resources facilitated the acquisition of the necessary skills and
materials (albeit sometimes by using coercion).
2. Influence–The dominant influence of FARC in the areas where the
development of the narco-subs occurred highly impacted the success
of this engineering task. This provided the group with access to
individuals with the necessary skills, ranging from members of the
Colombian navy to local fishermen. In addition, the Joint Western
Command instilled fear in neighboring towns and villages.
Surrounding populations were warned against discussing the nature of
the Command’s operations with authorities. 93 As a result, activities
carried on more smoothly and with less chance of discovery.
3. Safe Havens–The areas of operation along the Pacific coastline of the
numerous fronts engaged in the construction of the narco-subs are
largely beyond the reach of Colombian authorities. This contributed to
the successful development of the narco-subs because construction
was allowed to continue without disruption.
4. Culture of learning–FARC’s organizational learning capabilities were
exceptional. The time and effort that were devoted to each member’s
training and schooling exhibited a wide spectrum of learning that
facilitated the trial and error approach during the development phases
of the narc-submarines. FARC undertook several development phases,
each of which built on the phases that had gone before. This iterative
process absorbed lessons learned in each phase to improve the next,
ultimately leading to the successful development of a fully submersible
vessel.
FARC’s evolution since 2006, or some might even argue devolution in
ideology and the improvement in Colombia’s security environment, created a
challenging context for VNSA technological innovation.94 After the 9/11
attacks, the international security arena changed. As international criminal
and terrorist groups were targeted by law enforcement, FARC suffered
financial losses, leadership arrests, and desertion. Nevertheless, the group
has continued to develop narco-submarines as demonstrated through their
last standardization and maturity phase in 2007. Even though the adoption
“Narcosubmarinos,” Discovery Channel.
Román D. Ortiz, “Renew to Last: Innovation and Strategy of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC)” in James Forest (ed.), Teaching Terror: Strategic and
Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
93
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of this new technology was intended to facilitate drug transportation, the
designs of the vessels themselves are now an in-house capability and new
commodity which FARC can communicate to other criminal or terrorist
organizations for the right price in these times of need. The diffusion of
narco-submarine technology to other criminal or terrorist groups is of
concern to counter-smuggling and terrorism efforts in the region, particularly
if the vessels were to be used for more nefarious purposes than drug
trafficking. This illustrates how technology adoption and diffusion intended
to facilitate operations can itself become yet another stand-alone resource for
terrorists and potential collaborators.
The mixed nature of FARC’s ideology, coupled with its openness for ideas and
vast resources, provides a fascinating example of how violent non-state actors
explore innovative technologies to overcome challenging dynamics. FARC’s
need for strategic autonomy bolstered the group’s desire for innovation. This
fear of dependency molded the organizational norms, as well as decisionmaking processes and practices, gearing them towards self-sufficiency in all
their operations. The iterative process in the development of narco-subs is
demonstrative of the long-term commitment VNSAs with resources can
devote to innovative projects that facilitate their long-term strategic
objectives.
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Appendix A. Evolution of the Narco-Sub (1970s-Present)95
Years

Phase

1970s
through
early
1990s

Go-fast boats

Early
1990s
through
2004

Description
Fiberglass material. Deep “V”
offshore racing hull - usually
30 to 50 feet (10 to 15 m)
long, narrow in beam, and
equipped with two or more
powerful engines, often with
more than 1,000 combined
horsepower. The boats can
typically travel at speeds over
80 knots (150 km/h) in calm
waters, over 50 knots (90
km/h) in choppy waters, and
maintain 25 knots (47 km/h)
in the average five to seven
foot (1.5 to 2 m).
Fiberglass and wood; low
horse power engines; Many
different designs used;
Limited in range and
capacity.

‘Narco-sub’ Experimentation
Phase

Table extracted from Bunker and Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated
Vessels Used for Drug Smuggling Purposes.”
95
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2005 2006

‘Narco-sub’ Prototyping Phase
[semi-submersibles]

2007 present

‘Narco-sub’ Standardization and
Maturity Phase

Similar vessels seized [semisubmersibles]; Increased
engine power; increased
capabilities such as greater
stealth, better operational
performance, and increased
speed and size; Introduction
of low-profile vessels (LPVs).

Faster (up to 11 mph); Some
made from steel; Capable of
carrying bigger loads of drugs
than earlier models; Twodiesel engines; Engines up to
350 hp; Upper lead
shielding; Advanced
navigation systems; GPS;
Anti-radar features; watercooled mufflers.
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